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Abstract
We discuss and compare the variable population axioms of Critical Level
(CL) and Population Replication Invariance (PRI) introduced in the economic
and philosophical literature for evaluating distributions with dierent popu-
lation size. We provide a common framework for analyzing these compet-
ing views considering a strengthening of the Population Replication Principle
(PRP) based on Dalton’s (1920) “principle of proportionate additions to per-
sons” that requires an ordering deﬁned over populations of the same size to
be invariant w.r.t. replication of the distributions, not necessarily imposing
indierence between the original distribution and the replica. The strong ver-
sion of PRP extends the invariance condition to hold also when distributions of
dierent population size are compared. We suggest ethically meaningful gen-
eral speciﬁcations of the invariance requirement underlying the Strong PRP
and characterize the associated classes of parameterized evaluation functions
that include CL principles and PRI properties. Moreover, we identify a general
class of evaluation functions satisfying the Strong PRP: the social evaluation
ordering will be represented by the simple formula considering the product of
the population size times a strictly monotonic function of the Equally Distrib-
uted Equivalent Income (EDEI). Interesting ethical properties are shown to be
associated with the shape of the function transforming the EDEI. Implications
for poverty measurement are investigated.
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11 Introduction
Consider the problem of implementing an intertemporal welfare comparison over pop-
ulations of size qw possibly diering between periods w= Suppose information is avail-
able concerning a representative income level w that may correspond to per-capita
GDP or to a more general measure that takes also into account distributive concerns.
Similar problems occurs in evaluating demographic policies that might aect overall
GDP as well as its distribution.
The immediate course of action will be to specify a welfare function Zw that makes
use of period w information on population size and representative income. One might
support ethical views arguing that either population size or per capita representative
income are the only relevant aspects to take into account and therefore identify a
lexicographic order between them. However, if some degree of “compensation” be-
tween population size and social indicators of “quality of life” is allowed then one
of the simplest and intuitively appealing formulations for Zw might require to apply
a continuous increasing transformation to the representative individual income and
aggregate the obtained transformed measure of representative “quality of life” across
the entire populations. That is, social evaluation can be represented by the function
Zw = qw · C(w) (1)
where C(=) is increasing and continuous.
Despite the simple formulation of (1), through the speciﬁcation of C(=) it is pos-
sible to take into account a number of ethical views on the joint social evaluation
of population size and (inequality corrected) per-capita GDP. For instance if there
exists an income level ˜  [e.g. a poverty line or a critical (subsistence) level of income]
such that C(˜ )=0then for all w A ˜  an increase in population size improves welfare
while the opposite occurs for all populations whose representative income is below
the threshold ˜ .
The function in (1) is among those we study in this paper within an axiomatic
framework. We provide characterizations of parametric versions of (1) and identify a
general class of evaluation functions leading essentially to (1) and to its dual where
Zw = C(w)@qw. The two classes of parametric indices representing the variable
population social evaluation are
Zw =( qw)
 · (w  f) and Zw =  ln(q)+w for >>f 5 R.
The results are derived following a logical perspective where social evaluations are
required to be consistent when population are replicated i.e. when identical distri-
butions are merged. Implications for variable population poverty evaluations and
related indices are also explored.
The debate on variable population social evaluations. The Population Repli-
cation Principle (PRP), introduced in Bossert (1990a) and based on Dalton’s (1920)
“principle of proportionate additions to persons” requires inequality, welfare and
poverty comparisons of income distributions exhibiting the same population size to
2be invariant w.r.t. replications of the distributions. It is a weaker version of the Popu-
lation Replication Invariance (PRI) property often applied in inequality, welfare and
poverty measurement requiring that an ordering ranks as socially indierent income
proﬁles obtained by replicating the population. While the ﬁrst principle usually meets
the common intuition, the second stronger property is sometimes questioned and con-
sidered to lead to ethically unappealing results.1 As pointed out by Hurka (1983) the
average evaluation principles (which are obtained from population replication invari-
ant orderings) are questionable because they favor only population increases leading
to improvement in the average welfare, penalizing therefore addition of individuals at
acceptable levels of income but below the (average) representative income (or welfare)
level of the population.2 Moreover Amiel and Cowell (1998, 1999) draw attention to
evidence from questionnaires showing that the PRI property moderately meets people
views in the context of inequality and welfare comparisons (about 66% of question-
naire answers), and its support substantially decreases when poverty comparisons are
involved (50%). As Amiel and Cowell (1999) state (pp. 101-102, part within brackets
added): “In this context (poverty measurement) the ap r i o r ib a s i sfor the (PRI) prin-
ciple is less clear: one could plausibly argue that if the distribution is replicated...then
poverty is doubled...In assessing poverty -as opposed to inequality- people think much
more in absolute than relative terms”. This view is consistent with Kanbur (2001)’s
criticism of “classical” poverty measures that take into account the population share
of poor individuals in a society but neglect the relevance of their absolute number.3
It is therefore not always clear why the PRI principle has to be considered the
most appropriate criterion to apply in order to compare populations of dierent size.
One possible alternative is to posit that poverty (or alternatively welfare) increases,
possibly in a multiplicative way, when population replicates. This is for instance what
happens if welfare is evaluated according to the Classical Utilitarian (CU) criterion.
The associated social evaluation ordering is represented by the sum of the levels of
well-being of each individual within the society measured by a utility function de-
ﬁned over the individual income. This criterion accommodates average welfare and
population eects in a multiplicative way, it is immune from the critiques applied
to the average principles, but is subject to a major ﬂaw. As pointed out by Parﬁt
(1982) the CU evaluation, as well as many other criteria that consider total welfare
as the product of representative welfare and population size, suers from the repug-
nant conclusion.4 That is to say, for any population with positive high representative
individual welfare there exists a su!ciently large alternative population with slightly
1See amongst many Blackorby et al. (1997a,b; 2005), Carlson (1998), Arrhenius (2000) and
literature cited therein.
2Of course the extent of this critique depends also on the way in which inequality is accommodated
within the evaluation. One may consider a symmetric utilitarian welfare function where utilities are
increasing and concave and realize that the “more concave” are the utility functions, the lower
is the level of income at which an additional individual will induce a social welfare improvement.
For extreme inequality averse functions representing maximin positions, we get that no addition of
any individual with any income level will be a substitute for increasing the income of the poorest
individual in the society.
3See Chakravarty et al. (2006) for an exception.
4For a discussion of the repugnant conclusion see also Blackorby and Donaldson (1991), Blackorby
et al. (1997a,b, 1998, 2001, 2005), Carlson (1998) and Arrhenius (2000).
3positive representative individual welfare exhibiting a larger total welfare. Dier-
ent alternatives have been suggested in order to avoid this problem within a non
replication invariant framework of evaluation [see Hurka (1983), Ng (1986, 1989) and
Blackorby et al. (1995, 1997a, b)]. One of the most appealing solutions to the prob-
lem of the repugnant conclusion is the Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson criterion
of Critical Level (generalized) Utilitarianism (CLU), which is a modiﬁcation of the
Classical Utilitarianism. CLU sets a positive critical level of utility (or income within
the framework we will consider) which corresponds to the level of utility (or income)
that if held by one individual makes the addition of this person indierent to the
society. Total welfare is given by the sum of the gaps between individual utilities
and the critical level for each individual. Therefore in order to improve the welfare
(or standard of living) of an a"uent society, an alternative society has necessarily to
guarantee to the members a representative welfare above the critical level. It follows
that the CLU is immune from the repugnant conclusion.
Unfortunately as shown by Bossert (1990a) the critical level variable population
criterion and the replication invariance property cannot coexist within an inequality
averse framework. This result leaves open a fundamental question. What is the most
appropriate criterion to use? Moreover, the dierent criteria are based on alternative
perceptions of the principles allowing comparisons between distributions with dier-
ent population size. The procedure followed by the replication invariance property
considers hypothetical replications, thus any pair of distributions over populations
of dierent size can be indirectly compared, because there always exists a common
multiple for the number of individuals in both populations. The critical level appears
more restrictive for what concerns direct comparisons since it requires to compare
only distributions obtained adding one individual; however, indirectly, through se-
quential addition of individuals, all distributions of dierent population size can also
be compared. The principles adopted by the two approaches focus either on the infor-
mation about the distribution or on the existence of a reference income levels in order
to identify the “neutral transformation” to apply to a distribution. In this respect,
recalling Bossert (1990a) result, it may seem impossible to embed simultaneously the
two aspects in a principle that allows to compare distributions of dierent population
size. However, this is not the case, within the replication framework it is possible to
reconcile the approaches.
Aims of the work. Here we drop the PRI view and follow the consistency per-
spective underlying the PRP. As also shown in Blackorby et al. (2005) many of the
orderings adopted for the evaluation of variable population income prospects do in-
deed satisfy this principle, we argue that this is the case also for its modiﬁcation:
the Strong Population Replication Principle (SPRP) that extends the range of ap-
plication of the PRP also to comparisons of distributions with dierent population
size.5
We start considering the value function associated with a general ordering deﬁned
5Blackorby et al. (2005) refer to this principle [as Extended Replication Invariance] quoting an
earlier version of this paper and applying it in order to assess the evaluation criteria illustrated in
the book.
4over distributions with dierent population size. We use a result of Blackorby and
Donaldson (1984) and Blackorby et al. (2001a) which allows to represent the welfare
evaluation through a function that is separable in population size and representative
income of the society. We investigate some ethically appealing speciﬁcations of the
SPRP that lead to the characterization of classes of parameterized evaluation func-
tions accommodating representative welfare and population sizes. The more general
class provides a characterization for both the generalized versions of the average cri-
teria derived making use of population replication invariant evaluation functions and
a general version of the critical level variable population criteria. We then present
a general class of variable population evaluation criteria satisfying SPRP that also
includes the family of evaluation functions previously discussed. According to the
result the social evaluation can be represented by the product of population size times
a monotonic transformation of the Equally Distributed Equivalent Income (EDEI)
of the society. We then identify for this class of evaluation functions the conditions
under which it allows to avoid the “repugnant conclusion”. The results can be appro-
priately modiﬁed in order to be extended to poverty comparisons over distributions
with dierent population size, as suggested in the ﬁnal part of the paper.
In next section we introduce the notation and some preliminary results, we then
provide and discuss the main results on welfare evaluations and conclude with appli-
cations to poverty evaluations. Proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
Let N be the set of all natural numbers {1>2>3>===},w h e r eq 5 N denotes a population
size= Let R (R+) [R++] be the set of all (non-negative) [positive] real numbers and
Rq the n-fold Cartesian product of R. We consider the income distributions x 5 Rq>
where 1q denotes the vector consisting of q ones, therefore  · 1q will represent an
equal distribution of income over q individuals where everybody gets  5 R.6 The
set of all distributions with any possible population size is l := ^qMNRq.
We are interested in investigating social evaluation functions that represent a vari-
able population social ordering [i.e. a reﬂexive, transitive and complete binary rela-
tion] on l= For this purpose following Blackorby and Donaldson (1984) and Blackorby
et al. (2001, 2001a) we assume from the outset that the ordering satisﬁes extended
continuity and weak monotonicity, that is respectively a continuity property deﬁned
on l and a ﬁxed population condition requiring that distribution x is evaluated as
strictly welfare superior with respect to distribution y if it componentwise exhibits
higher income values.7
The implications of these properties are the following:
(i) We can derive a ﬁxed population cardinal indicator of welfare: the “Equally
Distributed Equivalent Income  (EDEI)” that is the level of income that, if owned
by all the individuals makes the distribution be socially indierent w.r.t. x= Thus
extended continuity and weak monotonicity imply that there exists a sequence of
6Our results are valid for x 5 Rq> but they can also be restricted to hold for positive incomes.
7We refer to Blackorby et al. (2001a, 2005) for formalization and discussion of the properties.
5representative-income (EDEI) functions sq : Rq $ R, a function for any population
size q> that represents the social ordering for all ﬁxed-population comparisons, where
sq(=) is continuous, weakly increasing [i.e. {l A| l for all l =1 >2>===>q , sq(x) A
sq(y)],a n ds a t i s ﬁes sq( · 1q)==
(ii) We also obtain a separable representation of the ordering on l in terms of
the population size and the EDEI of the distribution. The evaluation can be made
a c c o r d i n gt ot h eVariable Population Value Function Y (q>sq(x)) i.e. a function
Y : N × R $ R continuous and increasing in the second argument [see Blackorby et
al. (2001a) Th. 2].
Relying on the above results we take as primitive concept the notion of Social
Evaluation Function (SEF) Z : l $ R representing the variable population wel-
fare ordering. When appropriate we will equivalently consider directly the variable
population value function Y (=>=). We will take into account anonymous and inequal-
ity averse SEFs but it has to be stressed that our results are independent from the
adoption of these properties usually applied for inequality and welfare measurement.
Anonymity requires that only the income distribution matters irrespective of the iden-
tity of the individuals to whom incomes are assigned thus sq(=) is symmetric. While
inequality aversion is formalized by the consistency of the SEF with the Principle of
Transfers favoring rank-preserving transfers from rich to poor individuals, thus sq(=)
is S-Concave.8
We now introduce the main properties concerning comparisons between distribu-
tions of dierent population size.
The Population Replication Principle (PRP) (see Dalton, 1920 and Bossert, 1990a)
states that a population replication does not aect the ranking of two distributions of
the same population size. That is, if a distribution is considered welfare superior to
another involving the same number of individuals then their ranking is not aected
if the individuals in both distributions are cloned. Let xu 5 Ruq> for u 5 N> be the
distribution obtained from x 5 Rq replicating it u times, that is xu =( x>=>==x>==>x | {z }
u times
)>
then PRP requires that: for all y>x 5 Rq and all u>q 5 N
Y (q>s
q(x))  Y (q>s
q(y)) +, Y (uq>s
uq(x
u))  Y (uq>s
uq(y
u))=
The Population Replication Invariance (PRI) criterion strengthens PRP by requiring
indierence between distributions obtained through the replication process: for all x
5 Rq and all u>q 5 N
Y (q>s
q(x)) = Y (uq>s
uq(x
u))=
Properties PRP and PRI impose dierent restrictions on the value function. As
shown by Bossert (1990a): if PRI holds then Y (q>sq(x)) = K(sq(x)) where K(=)
is increasing and sq(=) is replication invariant i.e. satisﬁes suq(xu)=sq(x) for
all x 5 Rq and all u>q 5 N; while if PRP holds then sq(=) is replication invariant
8It is well known that Anonymity and Principle of Transfers correspond to imposing S-Concavity
on the equality (welfare) ordering, and that over distributions of same total income and population
size the inequality (welfare) ordering is equivalent to the Lorenz ranking. See Kolm (1969), Dasgupta,
Sen and Starrett (1973) and Fields and Fei (1978).
6without any further restriction on the functional form of Y (=). The second part of the
previous statements may come unexpected: an EDEI function may not be necessarily
replication invariant (see Example 8 in Appendix).
An alternative criterion to PRI is the Critical Level Principle (CLP), originally
suggested by Blackorby and Donaldson (1984). CLP involves the identiﬁcation of a
critical level of welfare (or income) f such that if an individual with f is added to
the original population the social welfare is unaected. Formally, there exists f 5 R
such that for all q 5 N and all x 5 Rq :
Y (q>s
q(x)) = Y (q +1 >s
q+1(x>f))=
Note that in this case f is ﬁxed, in analogy with an absolute poverty line it is in-
dependent from the original distribution and its population size.9 Bossert (1990a)
proves that CLP and PRI are not consistent for anonymous, inequality averse and
weak monotonic orderings on l.T h ec o n ﬂict between PRI and CLP is therefore in-
evitable, they are mutually exclusive. They are related to dierent logical structures
(replication vs addition of individuals) and apparently share very little in common,




l=1 X({l) satisﬁes PRI, while the Classical Utilitarian SEF ZFX(x)= Pq
l=1 X({l)=qZDX(x) satisﬁes CLP for f such that X(f)=0 .10 In general the Crit-
ical Level Utilitarian SEF can be represented as ZFOX(x)=
Pq
l=1 [X({l)  X(f)] or
as ˆ ZFOX(x)=
Pq
l=1 ˆ X({lf)= Many other welfare representations can accommodate
the two principles, for instance if we adopt the rank-dependent SEFs [see Weymark,
1981; Donaldson and Weymark, 1980; Yaari, 1987 and Ebert, 1988] we can rep-
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In general we can express the previous SEFs through functions combining popu-
lation size, EDEI and a reference level ˆ f as follows:
Z(x)=[[s
q(x)] or Z(x)=q · ([[s
q(x)]  ˆ f) (2)
where sq(=) satisﬁes PRI and [(=) is continuous and increasing. The previous cases are
obtained letting sq(x)=ZUG(x) and [(w)=w or sq(x)=X31[ZDX(x)]> [(w)=X(w)
and ˆ f = X(f)= If the eect of q is ruled out we have the standard PRI SEFs otherwise
we obtain evaluation functions satisfying CLP.
How can these rules be characterized within a common framework of analysis? Our
starting point is the observation that all the evaluation functions we have considered
s a t i s f yt h eP R P( a n da l s oas t r o n gf o r mo fi ts p e c i ﬁed in next section) even if some
of them are characterized without imposing any replication property.
In next section we will consider restrictions imposed on the SEF when a strong
version of the PRP is adopted. Because of the general nature of the property we
9Blackorby and Donalson (1984) and Bossert (1990a,c) consider a variable critical level f(x) that
depends on the starting distribution, while Blackorby et al. (2002) consider the number dependent
critical level f(q) that depends on the population size.




7will focus only on some plausible restrictions allowing consistency with the principle.
These restrictions are su!cient to lead to parametric speciﬁcations of the variable
population value function generalizing those above introduced and suggest a com-
mon framework of analysis where evaluation functions satisfying PRI and CLP are
obtained from the same generic welfare representation as the values of the parameters
change.
3R e s u l t s
We require that social evaluations satisfy a strong version of the PRP obtained extend-
ing the replication consistency condition on Y (q>sq(=)) to hold also for comparisons
of distributions exhibiting dierent population size.
Axiom 3.1 (Strong Population Replication Principle (SPRP)) For all x 5
Rq> y 5 Rp and all u>q>p 5 N
Y (q>s
q(x))  Y (p>s
p(y)) +, Y (uq>s
uq(x
u))  Y (up>s
up(y
u))=
Clearly SPRP implies PRP but the reverse implication does not hold, we can
therefore identify value functions that violate SPRP but satisfy PRP.
Example 1 SUS 6=, VSUS= Let J : R $ (0>1) denote an increasing function
bounded in (0>1)= Deﬁne ˜ Y (q>sq(x)) := 2 · J[sq(x)] + q  1= Clearly ˜ Y (q>sq(x)) 
˜ Y (q>sq(y)) implies sq(x)  sq(y); thus if sq(=) is replication invariant then ˜ Y (=)
satisﬁes PRP. Does it satisfy also the SPRP?
Take distributions x 5 R> y 5 R2 where x =( {) and y =( |>|) such that x and y are
considered socially indierent according to ˜ Y (=),i . e . ˜ Y (1>{)=2 J({)=2 J(|)+1=
˜ Y (2>|)= If we replicate once both distributions, we get ˜ Y (2>{)=2 J({)+1while
˜ Y (4>|)=2 J(|)+3 = It follows that ˜ Y (4>|) A ˜ Y (2>{) given that 2J({)=2 J(|)+1 =
Thus SPRP is violated.
The classes of SEFs where population sizes are lexicographically ordered w.r.t.
the EDEI do satisfy SPRP. Note that for these SEFs the socially optimal distribu-
tion is obtained either when just one individual exists or when the population size
is maximized irrespective of the EDEI. This second case is an extreme example of
t h et y p eo fS E F ss u ering from the “repugnant conclusion” where variations in pop-
ulation size can oset dierences in EDEI. Here we assume instead that changes in
EDEI can compensate for dierences in population size and we impose some degree
of “welfare comparability” between distributions with dierent population sizes. We
ﬁrst consider a minimal version of comparability ruling out the evaluations where
some welfare levels can be achieved only by distributions exhibiting a given popu-
lation size. Then we strengthen the comparability assumption requiring that EDEI
changes can always compensate for populations variations. As we will show even in
these cases we can obtain SEFs leading to the “repugnant conclusion”.
Let Y (q>R) denote the image of Y (q>=) for a ﬁxed q 5 N,t h a ti sY (q>R): =
{Y (q>): 5 R}, while Y (N>R) denotes the image of Y (=>R) that is Y (N>R): =
{Y (q>R):q 5 N}=
8Axiom 3.2 (Minimal Welfare Comparability (MWC)) For any z 5 Y (N>R)
there exist q>p 5 N> and q>p 5 R such that Y (q>q)=Y (p>p)=z=
The MWC property requires that any feasible welfare level can be obtained for ap-
propriate EDEI values by distributions of dierent population size, it can be strength-
ened requiring that this condition holds irrespective of the population size, that
is Y (q>R)=Y (N>R) for all q 5 N i.e. the function Y (q>=) is surjective.
Axiom 3.3 (Full Welfare Comparability (FWC)) For any q>p 5 N> and q 5
R there exists p 5 R such that Y (q>q)=Y (p>p)=
Note that FWC does not specify any relation between q and p= Changes in
population size may induce either positive or negative eects on welfare that may
depend on the value of the initial EDEI as well.
Example 1 provides evidence of a value function that does not satisfy neither
FWC nor SPRP, however it has to be noticed that the FWC (and also the MWC)
property is independent from PRP and from SPRP as shown in next examples.





q if sq(x)  0
q ·| sq(x)|
q if sq(x) ? 0 > (3)
then IZF is satisﬁed. However PRP is not satisﬁed unless sq(=) is replication in-
variant and even in this latter case SPRP is not satisﬁed. Suppose we compare, as in
Example 1, distributions x =( {) and y =( |>|) where {>| A 0 that are considered
socially indierent according to ˆ Y (q>sq(=)), i.e. ˆ Y (1>{)={ =2 |2 = ˆ Y (2>|)= If we
replicate once both distributions, we get ˆ Y (2>{)=2 {2 while ˆ Y (4>|)=4 |4 =[ 2 |2]
2 =
{2= It follows that ˆ Y (4>|) ? ˆ Y (2>{) thereby violating SPRP.
Example 3 VSUS 6=, PZF. This is the case when population size is lexicograph-










where sq(=) is replication invariant. Distributions exhibiting dierent population size
are ranked according to it, thus MWC is violated but replications do not aect the
social rank. While for distribution with the same population size SPRP is satisﬁed
because sq(=) is replication invariant.
According to (4) no compensation of any degree in terms of EDEI is allowed in
order to obtain socially indierent distributions involving dierent population sizes.
However VSUS does not imply IZF even when some degree of compensation is
allowed and PZF holds.
9Example 4 VSUS + PZF 6=, IZF.L e t
¯ Y (q>s













where sq(=) is replication invariant. The function ¯ Y (q>sq(x)) satisﬁes SPRP but
violates FWC. Note that sup ¯ Y (q>R)=q  1@2 and ¯ Y (q>0) = q@2  1@2 thus if

0 A 0 then ¯ Y (2q>
0) Aq 1@2 A ¯ Y (q>) for any  5 R.
Fulﬁllment of SPRP in conjunction with MWC corresponds to assume that a repli-
cation operation aects the social evaluation in a separable way based on the replica-
tion coe!c i e n ta n do nt h ev a l u eo ft h eS E F sa tt h es t a r t i n gd i s t r i b u t i o n .M o r e o v e r
MWC also requires that the set of potentially feasible welfare values is not aected
if the set of all distribution with a ﬁxed generic population size is not taken into
account, that is no population size is essential for reaching a given welfare level.
Lemma 3.1 Y (q>sq(=)) satisﬁes MWC and SPRP if and only if there exists a se-
quence of functions sq : Rq $ R satisfying suq(xr)=sq(x) a n daf u n c t i o n :
N × R $ R increasing in the second argument such that
Y (uq>s
uq(x
u)) = [u>Y (q>s
q(x))] (6)
for all u>q 5 N and all x 5 Rq> where [q>Y (1>R)] = Y (q>R),a n d
Y (N>R)=[N>Y(1>R)] = [N\q
0>Y(1>R)] = Y (N\q
0>R) ;q
0 5 N= (7)
Specifying the functional form of [u>Y (=)] amounts to impose restrictions on
Y (=)= These restrictions are precisely those we are going to investigate by adopting
for (6) a simple plausible and separable functional form= The most general results
associated with the mentioned speciﬁcation will turn out to be equivalent to the
relevant solutions of (6) derived in the second part of the section.
We compare distributions whose population is replicated u times, and the repli-
cated individuals are identical in all respects to the original ones. Each person there-
fore compares him/herself with a larger set of reference individuals: an u times replica
of the individuals dierent from him/her and u  1 individuals similar to him/her.
Welfare changes are supposed to depend on the replication parameter u according to
a positive multiplicative factor !(u) and/or and additive factor #(u)=
We require that the positive function !(u) and the function #(u) are monotonic:
they are either non-decreasing or non-increasing in terms of the replication coe!cient
u; given that these functions are independent this is the case also for the direction of
their monotonic eect.
The proportional eect formalized by !(u) is consistent with the view that changes
in overall social welfare that are induced by increases in population size depend on
the “average” welfare of the new population added, possibly compared with that of
the original population. When the merged population is a replica of the original one
then the welfare impact of the merging operation can be either positive or negative,
10it is related to the ratio between the new and the original population size and is
proportional to the average welfare of the original population.
The idea behind the additive eect formalized by #(u) is that welfare may decrease
[or increase] according to whether there exists a ﬁxed social cost [or a ﬁxed beneﬁt]
expressed in per capita units deriving from merging identical populations. Moreover,
because of the replication operation the per capita representative welfare may be
aected depending on the number of clones that are associated with each individual.
The impact of a replication therefore is independent from either the initial population
size or the EDEI, it only depends on the number of clones of each individual. A
positive or negative value for the mere existence of individuals is postulated, the
more individuals of a given type are included in the society the higher/or lower is the
per capita value of the mere existence of each one of them.
Next properties combine the proportional eect based on the per capita represen-
tative income of the distribution and the pure population eect that are induced by
the replication of the society. We suggest two versions of the a!ne replication ef-
fect. The ﬁrst version (GAfPR) is consistent with a cardinal concept of welfare, while
the weaker second version retains the replication eects within an ordinal framework
(O-GAfPR).
Axiom 3.4 (GAfPR: Generalized A!ne Population Replication) There ex-
ist monotonic functions # : N $ R where #(1) = 0> and ! : N $ R++ where !(1) = 1>
such that Z(xu)=#(u)+!(u) · Z(x) for all x 5 Rq> and all u>q 5 N=
Axiom 3.5 (O-GAfPR: Ordinal - GAfPR) There exist monotonic functions # :
N $ R where #(1) = 0> and ! : N $ R++ where !(1) = 1> and an increasing trans-
formation I : R $ R such that I[Z(xu)] = #(u)+!(u) · I[Z(x)] for all x 5 Rq
and all u>q 5 N=
These axioms are weaker than the PRI, in that the functions !(=) and #(=) are
not speciﬁed while PRI requires to set !(u)=1and #(u)=0for all u 5 N.B o t h
replication factors are assumed to be monotonic because there is no reason to allow
for changes in trends of the evaluation related to the pure population eect and the
proportional eect as the number of replications increase, however these eects can
take independent directions. Replicating a distribution may improve or worsen or
leave unchanged the welfare in the original distribution. All possible patterns are still
feasible, but it is not the case that dierent replication coe!cients induce changes in
the pattern of evaluation.
It is worth recalling that the evaluations satisfying O-GAfPR are made in an
ordinal framework, and we are not assuming from the outset that the function Y (=)
carries a cardinal meaning. What O-GAfPR implicitly requires is that for a given
ordinally invariant speciﬁcation of the value function Y (=)> and of the representative
income function sq(=)> it is possible to ﬁnd a distribution with dierent population
size and representative income that is indierent to the original one, and that this
comparison process can be carried out according to the pure population and the
proportional eect. It is the independence between !(=)>#(=) and Y (=) which turns out
to play a major role in imposing restrictions on the functional form of the latter and
11identifying invariance conditions. The restrictions imposed by GAfPR on the variable
population evaluation functions are summarized in the following propositions.
Proposition 3.1 Z(=) satisﬁes GAfPR if and only if there exist constants  5 R,
 5 R, an increasing continuous function [ : R $ R and a sequence of functions
sq : Rq $ R satisfying suq(xr)=sq(x) such that:
(i) if  6=0 >
Z(x)=Z>(x): = + q
 · [[(s
q(x))  ] (8)
for all x 5 Rq> all q 5 N> where the ordering induced by Z(=) is invariant w.r.t. a!ne
transformation of [(=) scaling the gap w.r.t.  i.e. W [[]: =
½
e1 [[  ]+
e2 [[  ]+
if [  
if [ ?
where e1>e 2 A 0=
(ii) if  =0
Z(x)=Z0>(x): = ln(q)+[[s
q(x)] (9)
for all x 5 Rq> all q 5 N where, if  6=0the ordering induced by Z(=) is invariant
w.r.t. additive transformations of [(=), i.e. W[[]: =d+[ where d 5 R.I f =0the
ordering induced by Z(=) is invariant w.r.t. increasing transformations of [(=)=
Applying GAfPR we obtain a parametrized class of variable population evalua-
tion criteria that generalizes the Critical Level SEFs and those in (2). Following a
population replication approach it is then possible to derive criteria that have been
characterized following a single individual addition perspective. The parametric wel-
fare representations in Proposition 3.1 are associated with the following speciﬁcations




 · [1  u]
 ln(u)
if  6=0
if  =0 =
They can include population replication invariant perceptions (if  =  =0 )but
mainly identify ﬂexible weights to apply to the population eects= If  6=0an increase
in individual representative income above the threshold [31() is weighted according
to the population size and induces a larger welfare eect as  increases. On the
other hand changes in the population size for a ﬁxed EDEI increase welfare if the
representative income is above the threshold [31() and  is positive. The value of
sq(x)=[31() thus represents a reference point for the evaluation playing a role
analogous to the critical level (or to a poverty line). Indeed, if we set  =1and A0
we can obtain the class of Critical Level SEFs, where [31() is the critical income
level above which the representative income induces a positive welfare eect.11 Note
11If in addition we impose the Population Substitution Principle (see Blackorby and Donaldson,
1984), requiring that replacing the income of each individual within a subgroup of the population by
the representative income of the subgroup does not aect the aggregate welfare evaluation, we get
an additively separable representation for q(=)= That is, q(x)=X1[ 1
q
Pq












where (f)= and f is the critical income level.
If we set  = X then the evaluation of the representative income is obtained adopting the utility of
the representative individual. Then Zq(x)=q1 ·{
Pq
l=1 X({l)  qX(f)} which for  =1gives
the Critical Level Utilitarian SEF=
12that if A0 then the representation in (8) suers from the repugnant conclusion if
inf [(R)   implying that [(sq(x))  A0 for all x 5 Rq=12
The other interesting family of SEFs in (9) is obtained when  =0 > i.e. when only
the pure population eect plays a role. When q =1(9) coincides with the evaluation
of the individual income, as the population replicates, depending on the sign of >
welfare may increase or decrease. Within a perfectly equal society adding an extra






@q.I fA0 the addition of individuals whose income leaves unaected the EDEI of
the society induce a positive externality impact eect @q which is inversely related
with the original population size. Thus this class of criteria suers from the repugnant
conclusion when A0> while on the other hand for  =0it is subject to the critiques
given to the average utilitarianism, as is also the case for ?0=
As a result both criteria obtained from the GAfPR speciﬁcation of SPRP may
suer from some of the critiques discussed in the introduction. But the reason does
not lie in the replication perspective, it comes from the way the SPRP has been
speciﬁed in GAfPR and also relates to the shape of the transformations [(=) in
Proposition 3.1. If we apply the more general O-GAfPR retaining the ordinal content
of the social evaluation then it is possible to recover the orderings induced by the
class of functions in (8) and (9) as special cases of a general representation that
is multiplicatively separable between the population size and a replication invariant
EDEI.
Proposition 3.2 Z(=) satisﬁes O-GAfPR if and only if there exist a sequence of
functions sq : Rq $ R satisfying suq(xr)=sq(x)> an increasing continuous function
¯ C : R $ R, and an increasing function K : R $ R such that:
Z(x)=K  [q
n · ¯ C(s
q(x))] where n 5 {1>0>1}= (10)
Thus any non replication invariant variable population evaluation satisfying O-
GAfPR can be represented as the product or the ratio of an increasing transformation
of the replication invariant EDEI and the population size. The representations in
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 satisfy the previous welfare comparability assumptions under
some restrictions on the values of the parameters or the image of functions [(=) and
¯ C(=)= Next remarks identify the exhaustive list of these conditions.
Remark 3.1 Only if at least one of the following conditions is satisﬁed then the
welfare representations in Proposition 3.1
- satisfy MWC: (1)  =0=; (2) sup[(R)    inf [(R); (3)  6=0 >
inf [(R) Aand
sup[(R)3
inf [(R)3 A 2||; (4)  6=0 > sup[(R) ?and
|inf [(R)3|
|sup[(R)3| A 2||;
(5):  =0and sup[(R)  inf [(R) A ||·ln(2) i.e.
sup[exp[(R)]
inf[exp[(R)] A 2||=
- satisfy FWC: (1’)  =0=; (2’)  6=0and [(R)=R; R++; R33;( 3 ’ )
 =0 >6=0and [(R)=R.
12For instance (5) can be obtained from (8) letting  =1 >= 1@2 and setting (w): =
arctan(w)@,a n ds u ers from the repugnant conclusion given that inf [arctan(R)@]  1@2=
13Conversely, if the welfare representation in Proposition 3.2 satisﬁes MWC [respec-
tively FWC] we necessarily have that:
Remark 3.2 Only if at least one of the following conditions is satisﬁed the welfare
representations in Proposition 3.2
- satisfy MWC: (1) n =0 ;(2) ¯ C(R)=R, ¯ C(R)=( z>+4) where z  0>
¯ C(R)=( 4> ¯ z) where ¯ z  0;( 3 )n =1and
sup ¯ C(R)
inf ¯ C(R) A 2 (4) n = 1 and
sup ¯ C(R)
inf ¯ C(R) ?
231.
- satisfy FWC: (1’) n =0 ;( 2 ’ )¯ C(R)=R; R++; R33=
The choice of the function [(=) and therefore of ¯ C(=) transforming the EDEI
thus plays a crucial role. However, when incomes are positive and, for interpretative
reasons, transformations are required to map in the income domain then the orderings
associated with dierent families of evaluation functions can no longer be always
derived through modiﬁcations of the monotonic transformations applied to the EDEI.
This view is summarized by the following axiom:
Axiom 3.6 (N: Normalization) Y (1>)= for all  5 R.
Note that by construction we have that Y (q>R)  Y (1>R)=R,t h u st h eN o r -
malization axiom allows to represent social welfare in monetary terms as the EDEI
does for ﬁxed population comparisons. Moreover, it is independent from MWC and
FWC as shown in next examples.










The function Y W(q>sq(x)) satisﬁes N but violates MWC. Note that for q  2 we get
Y W(q>R)=[ t a n( @2q);tan(@2q)] thus for any q  2 Y W(q>R)  Y W(1>R)=R =
Y W(N>R) therefore some values in Y W(N>R) can be reached only if q =1 > thereby
violating MWC.
IZF 6=, Q= The increasing transformation expˆ Y of ˆ Y (q>sq(x)) in (3) satis-
ﬁes FWC however it violates N as exp[ˆ Y (1>s1(x))] = exp[s1(x)]=
Adopting N amounts to restrict the set of admissible transformations of the func-
tion [(=) in Propositions 3.1. As next corollary shows (omitting the straightforward
proof) the only admissible set of functions [(=) are identities:
Corollary 3.1 Z(=) satisﬁes GAfPR and N if and only if there exists a sequence of
functions sq : Rq $ R satisfying suq(xr)=sq(x) such that:
Z(x)=
½ ˜ Z>(x): = + q · [sq(x)  ] if  6=0 ;
˜ Z0>(x): = ln(q)+sq(x) if  =0
(12)
for all x 5 Rq> all q 5 N.
14To summarize we essentially obtain two families of evaluation functions. If social





q(x)  f]; or Z
q(x)= ln(q)+s
q(x)=
In this case all the well known classes of EDEI functions satisfying PRI adopted in
welfare and inequality measurement can be substituted for sq(x)= For instance if we
consider the linear rank-dependent functions we obtain Z(x)=q (ZUG(x)  f)=
q31ZFOUG(x). Moreover, note that as a by-product of the result the characterization
in (12) satisfy FWC, indeed we have that irrespective of the population size Y (q>R)=
R.
On the other hand if we retain O-GAfPR and apply N the direct implication is
that according to (10) Y (1>)=K[¯ C()] = > thereby implying that K = ¯ C31> as a
result Z(x)=¯ C31[qn·¯ C(sq(x))] where n 5 {1>0>1}= Moreover, the normalization
assumption induces further restrictions on the image of ¯ C(=) in order to allow that
¯ C31(=) maps from the domain given by the set of values in Nn · ¯ C(R)= Thus, it has to
hold that ¯ C(R)=Nn · ¯ C(R)=
Corollary 3.2 Z(=) satisﬁes O-GAfPR and N if and only if there exist an increasing
function ¯ C : R $ R and a sequence of functions sq : Rq $ R satisfying suq(xr)=






q(x)) = ¯ C
31  [q
n · ¯ C(s
q(x))] where n 5 {1>1} (14)
moreover (i) if n =1then either ¯ C(R)=R; ¯ C(R)=( z>+4) where z  0> or
¯ C(R)=( 4> ¯ z) where ¯ z  0; (ii) if n = 1 then either ¯ C(R)=R; ¯ C(R)=
(z>+4) where z  0; ¯ C(R)=( 4> ¯ z) where ¯ z  0 or ¯ C(R)=( z> ¯ z) where
¯ zA0 Az .
As argued in next remark under the assumptions underlying the representation
in (14) the properties of MWC and FWC are equivalent.
Remark 3.3 The family of evaluation functions in (14) satisfy MWC and FWC
under the same assumptions i.e. only if ¯ C(R)=R; R++; R33=
The representation in (11) provides an example of a speciﬁcation of (14) for n = 1
that violates MWC given that ¯ C(R) := arctan[R]=( @2;@2)= The functions in
Corollary 3.2 are related to those we will derive in next section dropping O-GAfPR
and focussing on the general class of evaluation functions satisfying SPRP, N and
MWC. Before moving to the analysis of these general results we highlight the rele-
vance of the results in (12) and (14) for empirical applications based on summary
statistics. In particular Corollary 3.1 identiﬁes the normative implications for adopt-
ing evaluations based on parametric aggregation of average income, population size
a n da ni n e q u a l i t yi n d e x .
15Evaluations based on aggregations of summary statistics. Following the
normative approach to income inequality measurement [see Kolm, 1969; Atkinson,
1970; Sen, 1973 and Blackorby and Donaldson, 1978] then a SEF can be speciﬁed
consistently from a relative inequality index. In particular the EDEI can be formalized
as an “Abbreviated SEF” (Lambert, 2001 Ch. 5) weighting the average income by a
scale invariant (in)equality index.13 Suppose to restrict attention to positive incomes
and let Lq : Rq
++ $ [0>1] denote an S-Convex, scale invariant, population replication
invariant inequality index, then the replication invariant EDEI can be written as
s
q(x): =(x) · [1  L
q(x)]=
T h u st h eS E F si n( 1 4 )c a nb es p e c i ﬁed as Zq(x)=¯ C31 ©
qn · ¯ C[(x) · [1  Lq(x)]]
ª
for n 5 {1>1} aggregating information on population size, average income and
inequality making use of the transformation function ¯ C(=) that may implicitly identify
a critical level ¯ C31(0) for the representative income=
Example 6 Let fA0 denote the critical level. For n =1the speciﬁcation ¯ C({): =
ln({)  ln(f) gives Zq(x)=f ·{ (x) · [1  Lq(x)]@f}
q > while ¯ C({): ={  f for
A0 gives Zq(x)=[ f + q · [(x) · [1  Lq(x)]  f]]
1@ =
If on the other hand we consider the cardinal SEFs in (12) then we will obtain
two families of evaluation that can allow to represent a wide variety of ethical views
depending on the choices of the parameters and making use of available summary
statistics on population size, per-capita income and inequality:
˜ Z>(x):=  + q
 · [(x) · [1  L
q(x)]  ]; (15)
˜ Z0>(x):=  ln(q)+(x) · [1  L
q(x)]= (16)
3.1 A general class of evaluation functions satisfying “SPRP”
In this section we highlight the analogy between imposing SPRP, MWC and N on
the evaluation function Y (q>sq(=)) and the solution of a class of functional equations
applied in iteration theory: the “multiplicative translation equation”. We derive a
version of the “multiplicative translation equation” which is deﬁned over the set of
positive integers (population sizes or number of replications). The general solution
of this functional equation is still an open problem that goes beyond the scope of
this section. We consider the continuous particular solution associated with the most
common speciﬁcations of the functional equation deﬁned on the set of real numbers.
This solution coincides with the class of evaluation functions derived in Corollary
3.2, it is su!ciently general to include as special cases all the results obtained in
the previous section as well as most of the variable population evaluation procedures
presented in the literature. Moreover, it will make possible to identify a simple
condition that separates the evaluation functions that are subject to the “repugnant
conclusion” from those that are immune. For this latter class of functions the critical
l e v e lo fi n c o m ew i l lb ed i r e c t l yi d e n t i ﬁed.
13See for instance Chakravarty (1990) and Blackorby et al. (1999a).
16We consider variable population evaluations functions Y (q>sq(=)) that are in-
creasing w.r.t. sq(=) and satisfy N. Under the further assumptions of MWC and
SPRP, we can make use of condition (6) in Lemma 3.1; setting q =1and requiring
Y (1>{)=Y (1>s1({)) = { we get
Y (u>s
u({1u)) = [u>Y (1>{)] = (u>{)= (17)
Therefore (u>{)=Y (u>{) for all u 5 N>{5 R=
Substituting Y (u>{) for (u>{) in (6) we obtain the following functional equation:
Y (uq>s
uq(x
u)) = Y [u>Y (q>s
q(x))] for all u>q 5 N> for all x 5 R
q=
Noting that sq(=) is necessarily replication invariant (see Bossert, 1990a), and letting
sq(x)=> the functional equation can be expressed as
Y (uq>)=Y [u>Y (q>)] for all u>q 5 N> for all  5 R= (18)
This is the “multiplicative translation equation” (see Aczél 1966, 1987 Sect. 6, and
Moszner, 1995 and literature cited therein).14 I ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a t( 18) is
deﬁned for natural numbers u and q as well as for real values of = This speciﬁca-
tion opens the possibility of a variety of solutions generalizing the most common
ones derived for domains considering real numbers (see e.g. Aczél 1966, 1987). The
derivation of the general solution of (18) goes beyond the scope of this paper. Here
we present particular solutions that can be obtained when u>q> 5 R= Ap a r t i c u l a r
solution of (18) is obtained if Y (q>sq(x)) is independent from q for all q 5 N= This
happens when Y (q>sq(x)) = sq(x) where sq(=) is replication invariant. As in Aczél
1987 (section 6) the solution of (18) that is non-constant in q 5 R is obtained if
there exists a strictly monotonic [either increasing or decreasing] continuous function
C : R $ R (or C : R $ R++> or C : R $ R33) such that
Y (q>)=C




31 [q · C(s
q(x))] (19)
where sq(=) is replication invariant.
Noting that if ˆ C(): =C() then C31 [q · C()] = ˆ C31[q · ˆ C()] we can then
restrict attention only to functions C(=) such that either C(R)=R or C(R)=R++=
Moreover, if C : R $ R++ is decreasing we can let ˜ C(): = 1
C()> thereby obtaining
an increasing function ˜ C(=). We can then restate (19) requiring that there exists an
increasing function ˜ C : R $ R++ such that Y (q>sq(x)) = ˜ C31[q31· ˜ C(sq(x))] where
sq(=) is replication invariant.
To summarize, according to the solution of (18) we have that Y (q>sq(x)) 
Y (p>sp(x)) if and only if there exist replication invariant functions sq(=) and in-
creasing function C(=) such that if C(R)=R then
q · C(s
q(x))  p · C(s
p(y))> (20)
14It has to be noticed that (18) satisﬁes MWC only if conditions (7) in Lemma 3.1 hold. Recalling
that if N holds then Y (1>R)=R it follows that the only binding condition in (7) has to require that
Y (N\1>R)=R. Property FWC instead requires that Y (q>R)=R ;q 5 N=









Note that in both cases Y (=) is increasing w.r.t. sq(=).
Of particular interest in (19) i st h ec a s ew h e r e˜  = C31(0) -t h a ti st h eE D E I˜  s.t.
C(˜ )=0 = In this case any addition of individuals to the society implemented such
that the EDEI is kept at ˜  will leave the evaluation unchanged, also any replication
of the society will give this result. This is a stationary point for the solution of (18)=
Is it possible to overcome the “repugnant conclusion”? The answer is af-
ﬁrmative. For sure this is the case when C(R)=R++ and (21) holds but it is also
possible to overcome the repugnant conclusion when C(=) obtains both positive and
negative values. This happens because by continuity and strict monotonicity of C(=)
there exists a unique ˜  such that C(˜ )=0 = Then, if C is increasing any population
with representative income below ˜  will experience a negative value of C(),t h e r e f o r e
increasing the population size (keeping  ﬁx e d )w i l ll e a dt oad e c r e a s ei nq · C()=
Irrespective of its size the population component will not be able to compensate for a
low level of representative income: an increase in population size with an EDEI below
˜  will reduce welfare. From next ﬁgure it is evident that the existence of ˜ A0 ensures
that for any q>p 5 N for all 1 A ˜  and all 2 ? ˜  the condition qC(2) ?p C(1)
is always satisﬁed=
The solution to the repugnant conclusion for Z = q · C()
Therefore if C(=) is chosen such that C(˜ )=0 > then any x 5 Rq such that sq(x) A ˜ 
will be socially preferred to any y 5 Rp such that sp(y) ? ˜  irrespective of q>p 5 N>
limiting therefore the population size impact on welfare evaluations. Alternatively
if C(R)=R++ and (20)h o l d st h e nf o ra n ysq(x) A sq(y) there will always exist a
number of replications of y such that q·C(sq(x)) ?u q·C(suq(yu)) i.e. uA
C(sq(x))
C(sq(y))=
18The most common classes of variable population evaluation functions can be
obtained for a suitable speciﬁcation of C() and sq(x)= In particular if C()=






then the evaluation is made according
to CLU. Note that in this case the critical level is such that if ˜  = f we get C(˜ )=0 .
If X(f) is set equal to 0 we get the standard total utilitarianism.
In general if a critical level of income, independent from the income distribution,
exists then it has to be equal to ˜ =15 However existence of such ﬁxed level may imply
restrictions on C(=) and sq(x) as for the CLU speciﬁcation.16
3.1.1 An example: a pure population problem
We consider an application of (19) to a pure population problem [see Blackorby and
Donaldson, 1984]. A positive ﬁxed amount of resources ]A0 has to be divided
between a population of q 5 N individuals. The optimal population size qW is chosen
in order to maximize the social welfare. We consider the evaluation function in (19)
where C(=) is increasing and we impose inequality aversion for the ﬁxed population
evaluation leading to S-concavity of sq(x)= It follows that ] has to be shared equally
between individuals, therefore we have sq(]
q·1q)=]
q= Thus the optimization problem
becomes






Alternatively, letting L = ]
q denote the per capita income, the objective function is
rewritten as ]






s.t. ]  LA0=
If C(L) is positive for all L  0 [i.e. limL<0 C(L)=C(0) A 0 ] then the solution LW
to the problem requires letting LW $ 0 implying that qW $4 = This is an example
of the “repugnant conclusion”, a very large population (qW $4 ) with almost null
per-capita income (LW $ 0) will dominate in terms of welfare all the other variable
population income distributions. On the other hand, if C(L) ? 0 for all L  0 then
replicating the population, for a ﬁxed EDEI, will reduce welfare. As a result qW $4
will not be a solution because, given that C(L) ? 0, C(])@] will for sure dominate
limL<0 C(L)@L= Any qW can be a solution depending on the shape of C(=)> here follows
an example where qW =1 =












 exp(L)L +  exp(L)
L2 =(  exp(L))
1+L
L2 A 0>
15Consider distribution f1q> if a social evaluation neutral individual is added with income f then
q · 
(f)=q · 
(q(f1q)) = (q +1 )· 
(q(f1q+1)) = (q +1 )· 
(f) for all q> giving 
(f)=0 =
16The Number Dependent Critical Level (Blackorby et al., 2002) where the critical level depends
on the population size cannot in general be represented for a suitable choice of 
(=) and q(x)= The
reason is that 
(=) is independent from the population size and therefore cannot accommodate any
consideration taking into account a critical level dependent upon the population size.
19then it turns out that the function
C(L)
L is increasing in L= Thus the pure population
problem solution requires to maximize the per capita income, giving LW = ]> qW =1 .
The remaining alternative is when the range of C(L) is the set of real numbers
(or when limL<0 C(L)=0 ) . Then there exists a value ˜  such that C(˜ )=0 .I f
˜ A0 then C(L) will have both positive and negative values for LA0= It follows that
for sure LW A ˜  and therefore qW ?] @ ˜ > thereby avoiding the repugnant conclusion.
The optimal value qW will depend on the shape of the function C(=)= T h ec a s ew h e r e
limL<0 C(L)=0is equivalent to setting ˜  =0 = Then qW will depend on the shape
of C(=) and in principle an outcome leading to the repugnant conclusion can still be
optimal.
4P o v e r t y e v a l u a t i o n s
We highlight the implications of applying the SPRP for deriving ethically bases
poverty indices.
Let Sq(x>}):Rq × R++ $ R+ denote a poverty index evaluated for the income
distribution x 5 Rq given a poverty line }A0= As shown by Foster and Shorrocks
(1988a,b) poverty orderings are consistent with welfare orderings associated with
income distributions xW that are censored at the level of the poverty line, i.e. such
that {W
l = {l if {l  }> and {W
l = } if {l A} =Here we illustrate three parametric
formulations of variable population poverty orderings that are consistent with this
framework and the analysis developed in the previous sections.
First formulation. Poverty can be assessed as the welfare loss associated with
the existence of incomes strictly below the poverty line. More precisely, inspired by
Clark et al. (1981) and Chakravarty (1983) we suggest to derive ethical poverty
indices measuring the gap between the welfare associated with a censored income
distribution with no individuals strictly below the poverty line, i.e. the distribution
}1q> and the welfare of the censored income distribution xW. Thus a continuous and






Considering the general speciﬁcation of Zq(x) in (19) we get
S
q(x>})=C
31 [q · C(})]  C
31 [q · C(s
q(x
W))]=
Setting the representative “critical level” at the poverty line level }> i.e. setting
C(})=0 > allows to avoid a “poverty line based” version of the repugnant conclusion
where increases in population size through replication (thus also increases in the
number of poor individuals) can compensate for increases in individuals’ poverty
levels. As a result C31 [q · C(})] = } giving
S
q(x>})=}  C
31 [q · C(s
q(x
W))]=
20If C(=) is strictly increasing then C() ? 0 for ?} >any population replication
increases q (and also the number of poor individuals) leading to a poverty increase.
Consider for instance the speciﬁcation
C()=(}  )
1
 for   } and A0
thus C31({)=}  ({)
 for {  0 and A0> it follows that
S
q(x>})=q
 · [}  s
q(x
W)]= (22)
The poverty index in (22) is obtained weighting by q the absolute version of the
normative poverty index derived in Chakravarty (1983) Sq
ZW(x>})=[ 1 sq(xW)@}]
thus Sq(x>})=q · DS q
ZW(x>}) where DS q
ZW(x>})=} · Sq
ZW(x>})=
Note that if we denote by t(x>}) the number of poor individuals and let K(x>}): =







· [}  s
q(x
W)]= (23)
Therefore proportional population growth both for poor and non-poor groups of indi-
viduals aects (23) only through t(x>})> given that sq(xW) and K(x>}) are population
replication invariant. Thus, if A0> poverty increases because of the increase in the
number of poor individuals as suggested for instance in Amiel and Cowell (1999) and
Kanbur (2001).









l) the Absolute Income Gap,
i.e. the average income shortfall to the poverty line evaluated only over the population




13 · DL(x>})= (24)
combining the information on the Absolute Incidence of poverty [i.e. t(x>})]> on the
Relative Incidence of poverty [i.e. K(x>})] and on the Absolute Intensity of poverty
[i.e. DL(x>})].17 Of course it is possible to specify poverty measures that take into
account also the inequality aspect of poverty [which is neglected by DL(x>})].
Second formulation. An alternative procedure allows to identify directly poverty
orderings that are consistent with welfare orderings associated with censored distrib-




p(y>}) +, Y (q>s
q(x
W))  Y (p>s
p(y
W))= (25)
Recalling that sq(=) is replication invariant it follows that sq(xW) can be written
in terms of the poverty line and a replication invariant normatively based index of
poverty. We can either consider sq(xW)=}  DS q
ZW(x>})> or focus on a generic (ab-
solute) poverty index aggregating individual deprivation measured by a function s(=)
17Note that if  5 (0>1) the index Sq(x>}) in (24) is increasing in all components.
21deﬁned in terms of individuals income gaps. Taking for instance Chakravarty (1983a)






l) where s(=) is continuous, increasing, convex and s(0) = 0 we obtain sq(xW)=
}  s31[DS q
g (x>})].
Thus Sq(x>})  Sp(y>}) will require, for this latter case, that
C
31 ©















Setting for instance the following transformation for the EDEI based on censored
incomes C()={exp[s(}  )]}
1
 where  5 R\0 we get
} + s
31{ ln(q)  DS
q
g (x>})}  } + s








g (x>})   ln(q)  DS
p
g (y>})   ln(p)=




g (x>})   ln(q)> (26)
which is in spirit related to the absolute version of the family of poverty indices inves-
tigated in Chakravarty et al. (2006) and approaches the replication invariant classical
type of indices as  $ 0. Alternatively denoting by QDSq
g (x>}) the normalized av-
erage poverty deprivation evaluated over the population of poor individuals i.e. such
that DS q
g (x>})=K(x>}) · QDSq




g (x>})   ln[t(x>})] +  ln[K(x>})]=
Note that for ﬁxed population comparisons the relevant information is given by
DS q
g (x>})> if t increases then [if ?0] poverty increases. An increase in popula-
tion with t and QDSq
g ﬁxed reduces K and induces a marginal change in Sq(x>})
that for large populations can be approximated by gSq =[ QDSq
g +@K]·gK= Thus
gS q ? 0 only if K · QDSq
g A A0= That is, only if the original level of poverty
averaged across the entire population is su!ciently large then a marginal increase in
the number of non-poor individuals reduces poverty.18
Third formulation. Moreover, if we set C()=  s(}  ) where  5 R we get
}  s
31{  q ·  + q · DS
q
g (x>})}  }  s






p(y>}) / q · [DS
q
g (x>})  ]  p · [DS
p
g (y>})  ]
18This ﬁnding is in line with the theorem by Kundu and Smith (1983) stating the impossibility of
combining inequality aversion of poverty measures with a behavior that takes properly into account
increases in the number of poor individual and increases in the size of the non-poor population. In
our case in order to have a poverty index responding positively to absolute increases in the number
of poor individuals we need to set ?0> while if the poverty index has to unambiguously decrease
with the number of non poor individuals it is necessary that   0=
22which is precisely the absolute version of the class of poverty orderings characterized
in Chakravarty et al. (2006). Note that the "critical level" ˜  such that C(˜ )=
s(}˜ )=0is obtained when DS q
g (x>})=> thus population replications induce
an improvement in the welfare evaluation based on censored incomes an thereby
reduce poverty only if DS q
g (x>}) ? =
The procedure in (25) allows to derive families of poverty indices that are sensitive
to the absolute number of poor individuals and are consistent with traditional poverty
indices for ﬁx e dp o p u l a t i o nc o m p a r i s o n s .
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Two major properties are applied in the literature for the evaluation of variable
populations income distributions, the Population Replication Invariance (PRI) and
the Critical Level Principle (CLP). Their application leads to dierent orderings and
associated ordinal or cardinal welfare and inequality indicators. Moreover, they follow
completely dierent perspectives in comparing distributions with dierent numbers of
individuals. The former allows comparability between distributions obtained through
replications, the latter considers comparisons obtained adding recursively one extra
individual.
In order to derive a common framework of analysis we have considered weaker
versions of the PRI, the Population Replication Principle (PRP) and the Strong
PRP. The former requires invariance of the welfare ordering over distributions of the
same population size if they are replicated, the latter extends the requirement to
consider also distributions with dierent population size.
Imposing additional properties specifying the invariance of the ordering w.r.t.
replications we have characterized within a common framework of analysis general
classes of variable population evaluation functions and identiﬁed parametric eval-
uation functions that are based on summary statistics on population size, average
income and an inequality index. The more general of these classes includes as special
cases both replication invariant functions and the critical level principles that are thus
derived within a population replication framework and not a population addition one.
Furthermore, we note that the SPRP induces restrictions on the class of variable
population evaluation functions that are equivalent to those imposed by a version of
the “multiplicative translation functional equation”. A class of particular solutions of
this functional equation is investigated. These solutions are analytically very simple
but generalize the results presented in the ﬁrst part of the paper and provide an
attractive speciﬁcation to the variable population evaluation function suggested in
Blackorby and Donaldson (1984a) that is still general enough to include both average
(population replication) principles, critical level principles and classical utilitarian
principles. Making use of this general class of evaluation functions we have derived
ethically based poverty indices that may take into account also the absolute number
of poor individuals and not only their population share in the overall distribution.
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if q is even
if q is odd >











population we get ˜ Z6(6 · 16)=3( 6)









2= But 3 = 6 only if
¡
{(2)
¢2 = {(1){(3) which shows
that the EDEI function is not replication invariant.
A.1 Proofs
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Su!ciency. If the speciﬁcation in (6) holds, then SPRP is satisﬁed because  is order
preserving w.r.t. Y (=) while (7) ensures that MWC is also satisﬁed.
Necessity. Imposing SPRP in conjunction of MWC amounts to require that (6)
holds. MWC ensures that for any value in Y (N>R) there exist x>y 5 l and p>q 5 N
s.t. Y (q>sq(x)) = Y (p>sp(y))= If Y (q>sq(x)) = Y (p>sp(y)) then SPRP requires
that Y (uq>suq(xu)) = Y (up>sup(yu)) irrespective of the replication parameter thus
(6) holds. Condition (7) is a direct implication of MWC applied to (6). Moreover,
given that SPRP implies PRP then following Bossert (1990a) the EDEI function is
necessarily replication invariant.
In order to prove Proposition 3.1 we ﬁrst need to prove the following lemma.
Lemma A.1 A monotonic function ! : N $ R++ satisﬁes
!(uy)=!(u) · !(y)
for all u>y 5 N if and only if !(u)=u where  5 R> for all u 5 N=
Note that !(uw)=!(u)!(y) is a Cauchy functional equation, since !(=) is deﬁned
over N> we cannot make use of the solution valid for functions deﬁned over dense
sets (see Aczél, 1966). Aczél and Dhombres (1989) in Ch. 16.5 provide a general
result for deriving solutions of the Cauchy equation deﬁned over restricted domains,
including natural numbers (as in this case). As they show the previous lemma results
as a corollary of their Th. 16. Here we will follow the results in Donaldson and
Weymark (1980) and prove directly our claim. The next result follows from Lemma
1 in Donaldson and Weymark (1980):
Lemma A.2 (Donaldson and Weymark (1980)) The function ! : N $ R++







27where fl 5 R is an arbitrary constant and ql is the number of times the lwk prime
number (l ((1 =2 >( 2 =3 >( 3 =5 >( 4 =7 >==) occurs in the unique factorization of w
into primes.
P r o o fo fL e m m aA . 1 :Since !(1y)=!(1)!(y)> it is evident that !(1) = 1= We
follow now the proof of Theorem 2 in Donaldson and Weymark (1980) in order to
prove that given !(u) is positive and weakly monotonic, the solution of the functional
equation is !(u)=u>5 R=
Theorem 2 in Donaldson and Weymark (1980) shows that if !(u) is monotonically
non-decreasing then !(u)=u> 0= Since we restrict !(u) being monotonic,w ea r e
left with the case in which !(u) is monotonically non-increasing. Following exactly
the same logical arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2 in Donaldson and Weymark
(1980), we prove the second part of our statement.
Since !(u) A 0 then fl A 0 for all l 5 N it follows that we can write fl = (
l
l >
l 5 R= We need to prove that if !(u) is non increasing then l =  for all l 5 N=
Suppose the contrary i.e. !(u) is non increasing but l 6= m for some l>m 5 N.
Since N has a countable number of elements, then there exist two real numbers
O ? K> and a disjoint partition of N =( NO>NK) such that: l 5 NO / l  O>
and l 5 NK / l  K=
Consider now a number ¯ u 5 N> ¯ uA1> such that ql =0for all l 5 NK> that
is ¯ u is factorized by all the prime numbers in NO= Therefore !(¯ u)  ¯ uO> as well
as !(¯ uW)  ¯ uWO for all W 5 N= Consider now ¯ u +1 > or more generally ¯ uW +1 >


























































which contradicts the fact that !(=) is non-increasing. It follows that necessarily
l =  for all l 5 N> in which case !(u)=u= In order to satisfy non-increasingness
of !(u) we need to consider   0= Monotonicity of !(u) requires !(u)=u> where
 5 R=
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
We consider explicitly the value function Y (q>sq(x))= The su!ciency part can be
veriﬁed replicating x= For the necessity part we ﬁrst notice that the welfare evaluation
28of the un replication of x is Y (unq>sunq(xun)) = #(nu)+!(nu)·Y (q>sq(x)) and that
it can be decomposed into two replications of size u and n
Y (unq>s
unq(x
un)) = #(n)+!(n) · Y (uq>s
uq(x)))
= #(n)+!(n)[#(u)+!(u) · Y (q>s
q(x))]
= #(n)+!(n)#(u)+!(n)!(u) · Y (q>s
q(x))
leading to the welfare consistency requirement:
#(nu)+!(nu)Y (q>s
q(x)) = #(n)+!(n)#(u)+!(n)!(u)Y (q>s
q(x)) (27)
which has to be satisﬁed for all x 5 Rq> all q 5 N and all u>n 5 N= This condition
implies that the following system of functional equations has to be satisﬁed by #(=)
and !(=):
#(n)+!(n) · #(u)=#(nu) and (28)
!(nu)=!(n) · !(u) for all u>n 5 N= (29)
We require that the restrictions on the scalar and level coe!cients in the a!ne trans-
formation have to be independently satisﬁed. Otherwise, we can always set appropri-
ate values for Y (q>sq(x)) 5 R (or ﬁnd appropriate distributions x 5 Rq) such that





 for all u>n>q 5 N> 5 R.
For  =0we get
#(n)+#(u)=#(nu) for all u>n 5 N and
!(q)=1 = (31)
We let #(u): =l n !(u) where !(=) is the function in (29). Given the logarithmic
transformation both the domain restriction and the property of monotonicity of !(=)
are satisﬁed. We then get
ln!(un)=l n !(n)+l n!(u) for all u>n 5 N (32)
/ !(un)=!(n) · !(u) for all u>n 5 N
from which we can apply the result in Lemma A.1 and get !(q)=q where  5 R>
for all q 5 N> which gives #(q)=l n!(q)= ln(q)=




#(n) for all u>n 5 N>
that is
#(n) · [1  u
]=#(u) · [1  n
] for all u>n 5 N= (33)
29Since  6=0then 1  n 6=0and 1  u 6=0(if n>u 6=1 )we can therefore divide






for all u>n 5 N n>u 6=1 =
It follows that
#(q)
[13q] is independent from q which gives
#(q)
[1  q]
=  for all q 5 N, q 6=1if  6=0 >
where  5 R,f r o mw h i c h
#(q)= [1  q
] for all q 5 N, q 6=1if  6=0 = (34)
If n =1then from (30) #(1) = 0> similarly if u =1 = This extends the solution in (34)
allowing to include also q =1in the domain=
We need now to substitute into Z(x) for !(q)=q and #(q)= [1  q]
> 5 R,  6=0 =
We choose q =1 > and { = > then, after replicating u times we get
Y (u>1u)=#(u)+!(u) · Y (1>)
for all u 5 N and all  5 R. Letting [(): =Y (1>) we have
Y (q>s




where [(=) is increasing and continuous given that Y (q>sq(x)) is weakly monotonic
[implying that it is increasing] and continuous in sq(x). Rearranging we get
Y (q>s
q(x)) =  + q
 [[(s
q(x))  ]=
We now show that sq(x) has to be population replication invariant.
According to the obtained speciﬁcation for social evaluation functions consistent
with GAfPR we have:
If  =0 >
Y (uq>s
uq(x






u)) =  ln(u)+Y (q>s
q(x)) =  ln(u)+[  ln(q)+[(s
q(x))]
for all u 5 N all x 5 Rq> all q 5 N=












q(x))  ]] + =
Equating both sides gives
(qu)
 [[(s




for all u 5 N all x 5 Rq> all q 5 N=
It follows that in both cases [(suq(xu)) = [(sq(x))> from which, given that [(=)





30Invariance conditions. Note that welfare evaluation is no longer invariant w.r.t.
any increasing transformations of [(=) unless  =  =0 .
If  6=0 ,l e tW(=) be a transformation of [(=)> it (strictly) preserves the ordering
if for all x>y 5 l :
q
 [[(s





q(x))]  ]=( A) p
 [W[[(s
p(y))]  ]
We consider ﬁrst the case with equality. Let x = {1q> y = |1p, [ = [({)> and







it has to be that q [W([)  ]=p [W([0)  ] for all q>p 5 N= That is q [W([)  ]=






¢ =  where  5 Q++ is any
positive rational number.






¢ =  =
[03


















> where  5 Q++=
Let V
>
[0 = {[ : [ =  [[0  ] for all  5 Q++} and
W([0)3
[03 = e0> it follows that






[03 = e0= That is, the admissible transformation
is W([)=e0[ +( 1 e0) for all [ 5 V
>
[0 =
We ﬁrst prove the result for the case  6=0and  =0 > a n dt h e nw ew i l le x t e n di t
to  6=0and  6=0 =
Let  =0then V
>0
[0 = {[ : [ = ·[0 for all  5 Q++}.N o t et h a tV
>0
[0 is a dense
set in R++ if [0 A 0> while it is dense in R33 (the set of all negative real numbers)
if [0 ? 0= Therefore at least the admissible transformations are in principle dierent
depending on whether [ A 0 or [ ? 0=










necessarily e0 A 0=
We now prove that W([)=e1[ for all [ 5 R++> and W([)=e2[ for all [ 5 R33
where e1>e 2 A 0= We show this result for [ 5 R++= A similar result will also apply to
all [ 5 R33=




[1 = >= Note that if there
exists a value [0 such that [0 5 V
>0






[1 = Let [0 = [0
while [0 = [1> for > 5 Q++ it follows that [1 =
¡

¢ [0 = ([0 for ( 5 Q++=
Therefore [00 5 V
>0







[1 = >> we show that the coe!cients e0 and e1 have to coincide if Y (=)
satisﬁes continuity and weak monotonicity.
Let x = {1q> for { 5 R then [(sq(x)) = [({)> by weak monotonicity {00 A{ 0 #$
[({00) A [({0) that is equivalent to W([({00)) AW([({0))= Denote [00 = [({00) and
[0 = [({0) and suppose that [0 5 V
>0











[1 are dense in R++> then, given continuity of [(=)> we can choose
av a l u e[00 arbitrarily close to [0 such that [00 A [0> in which case it has also to be
that W([00) AW([0)= Given that W([)=e0[ for all [ 5 V
>0
[0 and W([)=e1[ for all
[ 5 V
>0
[1 > where e0 and e1 are not necessarily equal, then for any value [00 arbitrarily
close to [0 such that [00 A [0 the condition W([00) AW([0) / e1[00 Ae 0[0 is satisﬁed
only if e1  e0= Otherwise if e1 ?e 0 we will have e0
e1 A 1 and therefore it will always
be possible to identify a value of [00 su!ciently close to [0 such that e0
e1 A [00
[0 A 1=
Repeating the same argument for any value [00 5 V
>0
[1 arbitrarily close to [0 5 V
>0
[0
such that [00 ? [0 we get the restriction e1  e0= Combining both conditions we get
e1 = e0=
Clearly the same logic can be applied for all [0>[00 5 R33= It has to be remarked
that when V
>0
[0  R+ and V
>0
[1  R3 then e0 A 0 and e1 A 0 can be dierent.
To expand the proof in order to hold also for to and  6=0we consider the
translated variable ˜ [ : [ instead of [= Applying to ˜ [ the same logic followed in
the previous part of the proof we get the characterization of the invariance condition





e0[ +( 1 e0)
e1[ +( 1 e1)

for all [ A >
for all [ ? >
if [ = 
where e0>e 1 A 0=
We are left with the last case, i.e.  6=0and  =0 = In this case for all x>y 5 l
we have  ln(q)+[(sq(x)) = (A) ln(p)+[(sp(y)) /  ln(q)+W[[(sq(x))] = (A
) ln(p)+W[[(sp(y))]= T a k i n ga ne x p o n e n t i a lt r a n s f o r m a t i o no nb o t hs i d e so ft h e










Since the exponential transformation is strictly increasing the new invariance con-
dition turns out to be equivalent to the original one. Then, letting [(sq(x)) =












Following the same logic previously adopted for the  =0and  =0there we get
that when  6=0then W0[˜ [(=)] = e· ˜ [(=) where eA0= Note that here by construction
˜ [(=) A 0.
Rewriting explicitly ˜ [(=) we get W0[exp[(=)] = e · [exp[(=)]= Rewriting now W0[=]
in terms of W[=] we get:
exp{W[ln(exp[(=))]} = e · [exp[(=)] / exp{W[[(=)]} = e · [exp[(=)]
that is W[[(=)] = ln(e)+[(=)=
Letting ln(e)=d 5 R w eg e tt h a tf o ra l l[(=) the admissible transformation is
W[[(=)] = d + [(=) for all d 5 R=
32A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Applying O-GAfPR, from Proposition 3.1 we obtain that Z(x)=J  (Z>(x)) for
some increasing transformation J = I31=




|| if w  0
  |w|
|| if w?0
if  6=0 ;
E(w):= ||·ln(w) if  =0 >6=0 ; E(w): =w if  =  =0 = (36)





|| if [()  
|[()  |
1
|| if [() ?
if  6=0 ,
¯ C():= {exp[[()]}
1
|| if  =0 >6=0 >
¯ C():= [() if  =  =0 = (37)
Then letting K = I31E we get that Z(x)=I31(Z>(x)) = K [qn · ¯ C(sq(x))]
where n 5 {1>0>1}= Thus there exist a one to one relationship between n and ¯ C(=)
on one hand and [(=) and the values of > on the other hand. In particular n =0
if  =  =0 ;n = 1 if either ?0 or  =0and ?0 while n =1in all other
cases.
A.1.4 Proof of Corollary 3.2
From Proposition 3.1 we obtain that Z(x)=K(Z>(x)) for some increasing trans-
formation K= Applying N we get Z()=K([()) =  for all  5 R thus K(w)=
[31(w) for all w 5 R, where the function [ is continuous and increasing.





 if [()  
|[()  |
1
 if [() ?
if  6=0and (38)
C():= [ e x p ( [())]
1
 if  =0 >6=0
we identify the continuous and monotonic function C : R $ R such that C31(q ·
C(sq(x))) = [31(Z>(x)) for any [= Note that there exists a one to one relation
between functions [ and C and that the latter is not necessarily increasing, indeed
it is decreasing if ?0= Moreover, note that by construction, given that [(=) is
continuous and (strictly) increasing then [(R) is open, and (i) if  =0and  6=0or
 6=0and  5 [(R) then Z>(l)=R otherwise (ii) if  6=0and inf [(R)   then
Z>(l)=( >+4) while (iii) if  6=0and sup[(R)   then Z>(l)=( 4>)=
If  =0and  =0instead we have Z>(l)=[(R)=
Recalling that Z(x)=[31(Z>(x)) it follows that [(R)=R [case (i)]; or
[(R)=( >+4) [case (ii)], or [(R)=( 4>) [case (iii)]. In terms of the function
C(=) in (38) the range restrictions lead to: C(R)=R [case (i)]; C(R)=R++ [case
(ii)], C(R)=R33 [case (iii)].
T h eo n l yc a s el e f ti s =0 >=0leading to Z(x)=sq(x)=
33